

Computing with Pavlovian Populations^{*}

Olivier Bournez¹, Jérémie Chalopin², Johanne Cohen³, Xavier Koegler⁴, and
Mikaël Rabie⁵

¹ Ecole Polytechnique & Laboratoire d'Informatique (LIX),
91128 Palaiseau Cedex, France.

`Olivier.Bournez@lix.polytechnique.fr`

² Laboratoire d'Informatique Fondamentale de Marseille, CNRS & Aix-Marseille
Université, 39 rue Joliot Curie, 13453 Marseille Cedex 13, France.

`Jeremie.Chalopin@lif.univ-mrs.fr`

³ CNRS & PRISM 45 Avenue des Etats Unis, 78000 Versailles, France.

`Johanne.Cohen@prism.uvsq.fr`

⁴ LIAFA & Université Paris Diderot - Paris 7,
75205 Paris Cedex 13, France.

`Xavier.Koegler@liafa.jussieu.fr`

⁵ ENS de Lyon & Laboratoire d'Informatique (LIX),
91128 Palaiseau Cedex, France.

`Mikael.Rabie@lix.polytechnique.fr`

Abstract. Population protocols have been introduced by Angluin et al. as a model of networks consisting of very limited mobile agents that interact in pairs but with no control over their own movement. A collection of anonymous agents, modeled by finite automata, interact pairwise according to some rules that update their states. Predicates on the initial configurations that can be computed by such protocols have been characterized as semi-linear predicates.

In an orthogonal way, several distributed systems have been termed in literature as being realizations of games in the sense of game theory.

We investigate under which conditions population protocols, or more generally pairwise interaction rules, correspond to games.

We show that restricting to asymmetric games is not really a restriction: all predicates computable by protocols can actually be computed by protocols corresponding to games, i.e. any semi-linear predicate can be computed by a Pavlovian population multi-protocol.

1 Introduction

The computational power of networks of anonymous resource-limited mobile agents has been investigated recently. Angluin et al. proposed in [3] the model of *population protocols* where finitely many finite-state agents interact in pairs chosen by an adversary. Each interaction has the effect of updating the state of the two agents according to a joint transition function. A protocol is said to *(stably) compute* a predicate on the initial states of the agents if, in any fair

^{*} This work and all authors were partly supported by ANR Project SHAMAN, Xavier Koegler was supported by the ANR projects ALADDIN and PROSE

execution, after finitely many interactions, all agents reach a common output that corresponds to the value of the predicate.

The model has been originally proposed to model computations realized by sensor networks in which passive agents are carried along by other entities. Variants of the original model considered so far include restriction to one-way communications [1], restriction to particular interaction graphs [2], random interactions [3], with “speed” [7]. Various kinds of fault tolerance have been considered for population protocols [10], including the search for self-stabilizing solutions [5]. Solutions to classical problems of distributed algorithms have also been considered in this model (see [18]).

Most of the works so far on population protocols have concentrated on characterizing which predicates on the initial states can be computed in different variants of the model and under various assumptions [18]. In particular, the predicates computable by the unrestricted population protocols from [3] have been characterized as being precisely the semi-linear predicates, that is those predicates on counts of input agents definable in first-order Presburger arithmetic [3, 4].

In an orthogonal way, pairwise interactions between finite-state agents are sometimes motivated by the study of the dynamics of particular two-player games from game theory. For example, the work in [11] considers the dynamics of the so-called *PAVLOV* behavior in the iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma. Several results about the time of convergence of this particular dynamics towards the stable state can be found in [11], and [12], for rings, and complete graphs [16] with having various classes of adversarial schedulers [15].

Our purpose is to better understand whether and when pairwise interactions, and hence population protocols, can be considered as the result of a game. We prove that restricting to games is not really a restriction: all predicates computable by protocols can actually be computed by protocols corresponding to games, i.e. any semi-linear predicate can be computed by a Pavlovian population multi-protocol.

In Section 2, we recall population protocols. In Section 3, we give some basics from game theory. In Section 4, we discuss how a game can be turned into a dynamics, and introduce the notion of Pavlovian population. In Section 5 we state our main result: any semi-linear predicate can be computed by a Pavlovian population multi-protocol. Remaining sections correspond to its proof: we prove that threshold and modulo predicates can be computed respectively in Sections 6 and 7.

Related Works. As we already said, population protocols have been introduced in [3], and proved to compute all semi-linear predicates. They have been proved not to be able to compute more in [4]. Various restrictions on the initial model have been considered up to now. A survey can be found in [18].

More generally, population protocols arise as soon as populations of anonymous agents interact in pairs. Our original motivation was to consider rules corresponding to two-player games, and population protocols arose quite incidentally. The main advantage of the [3] settings is that it provides a clear understanding

of what is called a computation by the model. Many distributed systems have been described as the result of games, but as far as we know there has not been any attempt to characterize what can be computed by games in the spirit of this computational model.

In this paper, we turn two-player games into dynamics over agents, by considering *PAVLOV* behavior. This is inspired by [11, 12, 17] that consider the dynamics of a particular set of rules termed the *PAVLOV* behavior in the iterated Prisoners' Dilemma. The *PAVLOV* behavior is sometimes also termed *WIN-STAY, LOSE-SHIFT* [19, 6]. Notice, that we extended it from two-strategy two-player games to n -strategies two-player games, whereas above references only talk about two-strategies two-player games, and mostly of the iterated Prisoners' Dilemma. This is clearly not the only way to associate a dynamic to a game. Alternatives to *PAVLOV* behavior could include *MYOPIC* dynamics (at each step each player chooses the best response to previously played strategy by its adversary), or the well-known and studied *FICTIOUS-PLAYER* dynamics (at each step each player chooses the best response to the statistics of the past history of strategies played by its adversary). We refer to [13, 8] for a presentation of results known about the properties of the obtained dynamics according to the properties of the underlying game. This is clearly non-exhaustive, and we refer to [6] for a zoology of possible behaviors for the particular iterated Prisoners' Dilemma game, with discussions of their compared merits.

Recently Jaggard et al. [16] studied a distributed model similar to protocol populations where the interactions between pairs of agents correspond to a game. Unlike in our model, each agent has there its own pay-off matrix and has some knowledge of the history. This work gives several non-convergence results.

In this paper we consider possibly asymmetric games. In a recent paper [9] we discussed population protocols corresponding to Pavlovian strategies obtained from *symmetric* games and we gave some protocols to compute some basic predicates. Unlike what we obtain here, where we prove that any computable predicate is computable by an asymmetric Pavlovian population protocol, restricting to symmetric games seems a (too) strong restriction and most predicates (e.g. counting up to 5, to check where $x = 0 \pmod 2$) seems not even computable.

2 Population Protocols

A protocol [3] is given by $(Q, \Sigma, \iota, \omega, \delta)$ with the following components. Q is a finite set of *states*. Σ is a finite set of *input symbols*. $\iota : \Sigma \rightarrow Q$ is the initial state mapping, and $\omega : Q \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is the individual output function. $\delta \subseteq Q^4$ is a joint transition relation that describes how pairs of agents can interact. Relation δ is sometimes described by listing all possible interactions using the notation $(q_1, q_2) \rightarrow (q'_1, q'_2)$, or even the notation $q_1 q_2 \rightarrow q'_1 q'_2$, for $(q_1, q_2, q'_1, q'_2) \in \delta$ (with the convention that $(q_1, q_2) \rightarrow (q_1, q_2)$ when no rule is specified with (q_1, q_2) in the left-hand side). The protocol is termed *deterministic* if for all pairs (q_1, q_2) there is only one pair (q'_1, q'_2) with $(q_1, q_2) \rightarrow (q'_1, q'_2)$. In that case, we write $\delta_1(q_1, q_2)$ for the unique q'_1 and $\delta_2(q_1, q_2)$ for the unique q'_2 .

Computations of a protocol proceed in the following way. The computation takes place among n agents, where $n \geq 2$. A *configuration* of the system can be described by a vector of all the agents' states. The state of each agent is an element of Q . Because agents with the same states are indistinguishable, each configuration can be summarized as an unordered multiset of states, and hence of elements of Q . Each agent is given initially some input value from Σ : Each agent's initial state is determined by applying ι to its input value. This determines the initial configuration of the population.

An execution of a protocol proceeds from the initial configuration by interactions between pairs of agents. Suppose that two agents in state q_1 and q_2 meet and have an interaction. They can change into state q'_1 and q'_2 if (q_1, q_2, q'_1, q'_2) is in the transition relation δ . If C and C' are two configurations, we write $C \rightarrow C'$ if C' can be obtained from C by a single interaction of two agents: this means that C contains two states q_1 and q_2 and C' is obtained by replacing q_1 and q_2 by q'_1 and q'_2 in C , where $(q_1, q_2, q'_1, q'_2) \in \delta$. An *execution* of the protocol is an infinite sequence of configurations C_0, C_1, C_2, \dots , where C_0 is an initial configuration and $C_i \rightarrow C_{i+1}$ for all $i \geq 0$. An execution is *fair* if for every configuration C that appears infinitely often in the execution, if $C \rightarrow C'$ for some configuration C' , then C' appears infinitely often in the execution. As proved in [4], the fairness condition implies that any global configuration that is infinitely often reachable is eventually reached.

At any point during an execution, each agent's state determines its output at that time. If the agent is in state q , its output value is $\omega(q)$. The configuration output is 0 (resp. 1) if all the individual outputs are 0 (resp. 1). If the individual outputs are mixed 0s and 1s then the output of the configuration is undefined.

Let p be a predicate over multisets of elements of Σ . Predicate p can be considered as a function whose range is $\{0, 1\}$ and whose domain is the collection of these multisets. The predicate is said to be computed by the protocol if, for every multiset I , and every fair execution that starts from the initial configuration corresponding to I , the output value of every agent eventually stabilizes to $p(I)$. Predicates can also be considered as functions whose range is $\{0, 1\}$ and whose domain is $\mathbb{N}^{|\Sigma|}$. The following is then known.

Theorem 1 ([3, 4]). *A predicate is computable in the population protocol model if and only if it is semilinear.*

Recall that semilinear sets are exactly the sets that are definable in first-order Presburger arithmetic [20].

3 Game Theory

We now recall the simplest concepts from Game Theory. We focus on non-cooperative games, with complete information, in normal form.

The simplest game is made up of two players, called I (or *initiator*) and R (or *responder*), with a finite set of actions, called *pure strategies*, $Strat(I)$ and $Strat(R)$. Denote by $A_{i,j}$ (resp. $B_{i,j}$) the score for player I (resp. R) when I uses strategy $i \in Strat(I)$ and R uses strategy $j \in Strat(R)$. The scores are given

by $n \times m$ matrices A and B , where n and m are the cardinality of $Strat(I)$ and $Strat(R)$.

A strategy x in $Strat(I)$ is said to be a best response to strategy y in $Strat(R)$, denoted by $x \in BR_A(y)$ if $A_{z,y} \leq A_{x,y}$ for all strategies $z \in Strat(I)$. Conversely, a strategy $y \in Strat(R)$ satisfies $y \in BR_B(x)$ if $B_{x,z} \leq B_{x,y}$ for all strategies $z \in Strat(R)$. A pair (x, y) is a (*pure*) *Nash equilibrium* if $x \in BR_A(y)$ and $y \in BR_B(x)$. In other words, two strategies (x, y) form a Nash equilibrium if in that state neither of the players has a unilateral interest to deviate from it.

There are two main approaches to discuss dynamics of games. The first consists in repeating games [8]. The second in using models from evolutionary game theory. Refer to [14, 21] for a presentation of this latter approach.

Repeating k times a game, is equivalent to extending the space of actions into $Strat(I)^k$ and $Strat(R)^k$: player I (respectively R) chooses his or her action $\mathbf{x}(t) \in Strat(I)$, (resp. $\mathbf{y}(t) \in Strat(R)$) at time t for $t = 1, 2, \dots, k$. This is equivalent to a two-player game with respectively n^k and m^k choices for players.

In practice, player I (respectively R) has to solve the following problem at each time t : given the history of the game up to now, that is to say $X_{t-1} = \mathbf{x}(1), \dots, \mathbf{x}(t-1)$ and $Y_{t-1} = \mathbf{y}(1), \dots, \mathbf{y}(t-1)$ what should I (resp. R) play at time t ? In other words, how to choose $\mathbf{x}(t) \in Strat(I)$? (resp. $\mathbf{y}(t) \in Strat(R)$?)

It is natural to suppose that this is given by some behavior rules: $\mathbf{x}(t) = f(X_{t-1}, Y_{t-1})$ and $\mathbf{y}(t) = g(X_{t-1}, Y_{t-1})$ for some particular functions f and g .

The question of the best behavior rule to use in games, in particular for the Prisoners' Dilemma gave birth to an important literature. In particular, after the book [6], that describes the results of tournaments of behavior rules for the iterated Prisoners' Dilemma, and that argues that there exists a best behavior rule called *TIT – FOR – TAT*. This consists in cooperating at the first step, and then do the same thing as the adversary at subsequent times. A lot of other behaviors, most of them with very picturesque names have been proposed and studied: see for example [6].

Among possible behaviors there is *PAVLOV* behavior: in the iterated Prisoners' Dilemma, a player cooperates if and only if both players opted for the same alternative in the previous move. This name [6, 17, 19] stems from the fact that this strategy embodies an almost reflex-like response to the payoff: it repeats its former move if it was rewarded above a threshold value, but switches behavior if it was punished by receiving under this value. Refer to [19] for some study of this strategy in the spirit of Axelrod's tournaments. The *PAVLOV* behavior can also be termed *WIN-STAY, LOSE-SHIFT* since if the play on the previous round results in a success, then the agent plays the same strategy on the next round. Alternatively, if the play resulted in a failure the agent switches to another action [6, 19].

4 From Games To Population Protocols

In the spirit of the previous discussion, to any game, we can associate a population protocol as follows, corresponding to a *PAVLOV*(ian) behaviour:

Definition 1 (Associating a Protocol to a Game). Assume a (possibly asymmetric) two-player game is given. Let A and B be the corresponding matrices. Let Δ be some threshold.

The protocol associated to the game is a population protocol whose set of states is Q , where $Q = \text{Strat}(I) = \text{Strat}(R)$ is the set of strategies of the game, and whose transition rules δ are given as follows: $(q_1, q_2, q'_1, q'_2) \in \delta$ where

- $q'_1 = q_1$ when $A_{q_1, q_2} \geq \Delta$,
- $q'_1 \in BR_A(q_2)$ when $A_{q_1, q_2} < \Delta$,
- $q'_2 = q_2$ when $B_{q_2, q_1} \geq \Delta$,
- $q'_2 \in BR_B(q_1)$ when $B_{q_2, q_1} < \Delta$.

Definition 2 (Pavlovian Population Protocol). A population protocol is Pavlovian if it can be obtained from a game as above.

A population protocol obtained from a game as above will be termed *deterministic* if best responses are assumed to be unique; in this case, the rules are deterministic: for all q_1, q_2 , there is a unique q'_1 and a unique q'_2 such that $(q_1, q_2, q'_1, q'_2) \in \delta$.

In order to avoid to talk about matrices, we start by stating some structural properties of Pavlovian population protocols.

Proposition 1. Consider a set of rules. For all rules $ab \rightarrow a'b'$, we denote $\delta_a^I(b) = b'$ and $\delta_b^R(a) = a'$. Let $\text{Stable}^I(a) = \{x \in Q \mid \delta_a^I(x) = x\}$, and $\text{Stable}^R(a) = \{x \in Q \mid \delta_a^R(x) = x\}$.

Then the set of rules is deterministic Pavlovian iff $\forall a \in Q \exists \max^I(a) \in \text{Stable}^I(a)$ and $\exists \max^R(a) \in \text{Stable}^R(a)$ such that for all states a ,

1. $\forall b \notin \text{Stable}^I(a)$ implies $\delta_a^I(b) = \max^I(a)$.
2. $\forall b \notin \text{Stable}^R(a)$ implies $\delta_a^R(b) = \max^R(a)$.

Proof. First, we consider a Pavlovian population protocol P obtained from corresponding matrices A and B . Let Δ be the associated threshold. Let a be an arbitrary state in Q , and let q be the best response to strategy a for matrix B .

Focus on the rule $aq \rightarrow a'q'$ where $(a', q') \in Q^2$, i.e., focus on the case where player I plays a while player R plays q . As $q = BR_B(a)$, we have, by Definition 1, q' equals to q . Thus, $q \in \text{Stable}^I(a)$.

Now, let consider b such that $b \notin \text{Stable}^I(a)$. We focus on the rule $ab \rightarrow a''b'$ where $(a'', b') \in Q^2$. So by definition of set Stable^I , we have $b \neq b'$. Using Definition 1, we have $B_{b,a} < \Delta$ and $b' = BR_B(a)$. So $b' = BR_B(a) = q$. Thus, if we let $\max^I(a) = q$, $\max^I(a)$ satisfies the conditions of the proposition.

Using similar arguments, we can also prove that $\exists \max^R(a) \in \text{Stable}^R(a)$ such that $\forall b \notin \text{Stable}^R(a)$ implies $\delta_a^R(b) = \max^R(a)$. In fact, we can sum up the relationship between the game matrix and rules by the following: for any $a \in Q$, we have $\text{Stable}^I(a) = \{x \in Q \mid B_{x,a} \geq \Delta\} \cup \{BR_B(a)\}$ and $\max^I(a) = BR_B(a)$ and $\text{Stable}^R(a) = \{x \in Q \mid A_{x,a} \geq \Delta\} \cup \{BR_A(a)\}$ and $\max^R(a) = BR_A(a)$.

Conversely, consider a population protocol P satisfying the properties of the proposition. All rules $ab \rightarrow a'b'$ are such that $\delta_a^I(b) = b'$ and $\delta_b^R(a) = a'$. We focus on the construction on a two-player game having the corresponding matrices A , and B . We fix an arbitrary value Δ as the threshold of the corresponding game.

- If $Stable^I(a) \neq Q$, then $B_{max^I(a),a} = \Delta + 1$. If $x \in Stable^I(a)$ and if $x \neq max^I(a)$ then $B_{x,a} = \Delta$. If $x \notin Stable^I(a)$, then $B_{x,a} = \Delta - 1$.
- If $Stable^I(a) = Q$, then $\forall x \in Q, B_{x,a} = \Delta$.
- If $Stable^R(a) \neq Q$, then $A_{max^R(a),a} = \Delta + 1$. If $x \in Stable^R(a)$ and if $x \neq max^R(a)$ then $A_{x,a} = \Delta$. If $x \notin Stable^R(a)$, then $A_{x,a} = \Delta - 1$.
- If $Stable^R(a) = Q$, then $\forall x \in Q, A_{x,a} = \Delta$.

It is easy to see that this game describes all rules of P . So, P is a Pavlovian population Protocol.

5 Main Result

Inverting value of the individual output function, the class of predicates computable by a Pavlovian population protocol is clearly closed under negation. However, this is not clear that predicates computable by Pavlovian population protocols are closed under conjunction or disjunction.

This is true if one considers *multi-protocol*. The idea is to consider k (possibly asymmetric) two-player games. At each step, each player chooses a strategy for each of the k games. Now each of the k games is played independently when two agents meet. Formally:

Definition 3 (Multiprotocol). *Consider k (possibly asymmetric) two-player games. For game i , let Q^i be the corresponding states, A^i and B^i the corresponding matrices.*

The associated population protocol is the population protocol whose set of states is $Q = Q^1 \times Q^2 \times \dots \times Q^k$, and whose transition rules are given as follows: $((q_1^1, \dots, q_1^k), (q_2^1, \dots, q_2^k), (q_1^{i'}, \dots, q_1^{k'}), (q_2^{i'}, \dots, q_2^{k'})) \in \delta$ where, for all $1 \leq i \leq k$, $(q_1^i, q_2^i, q_1^{i'}, q_2^{i'})$ is a transition of the Pavlovian population protocol associated to the i th game.

Notice that, when considering population protocols, a multi-protocol is a particular population protocol. This is the key property used in [3] to prove that stably computable predicates are closed under boolean operations. When considering Pavlovian games, one can build multi-protocols that are not Pavlovian protocols, and it is not clear whether one can always transform any pavlovian multi-protocol into an equivalent pavlovian protocol.

As explained before, multisets of elements of $\Sigma = (\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_l)$ are in bijection with elements of \mathbb{N}^l , and can be represented by a vector (x_1, \dots, x_l) of non-negative integers where x_i is the number of occurrences of σ_i in the multiset. Thus, we consider predicates ψ over vectors of non-negative integers. We write $[\psi]$ for their characteristic functions. Recall that a predicate is semi-linear iff it is Presburger definable [20]. Semi-linear predicate correspond to boolean combinations of threshold predicates and modulo predicates defined as follows (variables x_i represent the number of agents initially in state σ_i): A *threshold* predicate is of the form $[\Sigma a_i x_i \geq k]$, where $\forall i, a_i \in \mathbb{Z}, k \in \mathbb{Z}$ and the x_i s are variables. A *modulo* predicate is of the form $[\Sigma a_i x_i \equiv b \pmod k]$, where $\forall i, a_i \in \mathbb{Z}, k \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{0, 1\}, b \in [1, k - 1]$ and the x_i s are variables.

We can then state our main result:

Theorem 2. *For any predicate ψ , the following conditions are equivalent:*

- ψ is computable by a population protocol
- ψ is computable by a Pavlovian population multi-protocol
- ψ is semi-linear.

The proof of the following proposition can be found in Appendix A.1.

Proposition 2. *The class of predicates computable by multi-games are closed under boolean operations.*

As from Proposition 2, predicates computable by Pavlovian population multi-protocols are closed under boolean operations, and as a Pavlovian population protocol is a particular Pavlovian population multi-protocol, and as predicates computable by (general) population protocols are known to be exactly semi-linear predicates, to prove Theorem 2 we only need to prove that we can compute threshold predicates and modulo predicates by Pavlovian population protocols. This is the purpose of the following sections.

6 Threshold Predicates

In this section, we prove that we can compute threshold predicates using Pavlovian protocols.

Proposition 3. *For any integer k , and any integers a_1, a_2, \dots, a_m there exists a Pavlovian population protocol that computes $[\sum_{i=1}^m a_i x_i \geq k]$.*

First note, that we can assume without loss of generality that $k \geq 1$. Indeed, $[\sum a_i x_i \geq -k] = [\sum (-a_i) x_i \leq k] = [\sum (-a_i) x_i < k + 1]$ which is the negation of $[\sum (-a_i) x_i \geq k + 1]$. Thus from a population protocol computing $[\sum (-a_i) x_i \geq k + 1]$ with $k \geq 0$, we just have to inverse the output function to obtain a population protocol that computes $[\sum a_i x_i \geq -k]$.

The purpose of the rest of this section is to prove Proposition 3. We first discuss some basic ideas: Our techniques are inspired by the work of Angluin et al. [1]. The set of states we use is the set of integers from $[-M, M]$ where $M = \max(|a_i|, 2k - 1)$. Each agent with input σ_i is given an initial weight of a_i . During the execution, the sum of the weights over the whole population is preserved. In [4], the general idea is the following: two interacting agents with positive weights p and q such that $p + q \leq M$ are transformed into an agent with weight 0 and an agent with weight $p + q$, while two agents with weight p and q such that $p + q > M$ are transformed into two agents with weight $\lfloor (p + q)/2 \rfloor$ and $\lceil (p + q)/2 \rceil$ that are both greater or equal to k .

In our setting, we cannot use the same rules since all agents that change their states when they meet an agent in state p while being initiator (resp. responder) must take the same state that only depends of p . To avoid this problem, a trick is to use rules of the following form: $pq \rightarrow (p+1)(q-1)$. However, we also have to make sure that the protocol enables all agents to agree in the final configuration.

Whereas this kind of consideration is easy in the classical population protocol model, this turns out to be tricky in our settings.

We describe a protocol that computes $[\sum_{i=1}^m a_i x_i \geq k]$. Our protocol is defined as follows: we consider $\Sigma = \{\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_l\}$, $Q = \{\top\} \cup [-M, M]$; for all i , $\iota(\sigma_i) = a_i$; and we take $\omega(\top) = 1$ and for any $p \in [-M, M]$, $\omega(p) = 1$ if and only if $p \geq 1$.

We distinguish two cases: either $k = 1$, or $k \geq 2$. We present two protocols here, because we need to have a mechanism in our protocols to enable to “broadcast” the result; this is not so difficult in the first case whereas it is more technical in the second one. Due to lack of space, we only give the rules for $k = 1$ (the proof can be found in Appendix A.2), but provide a full proof for the case $k \geq 2$.

Case $k = 1$. Our protocol computing $[\sum a_i x_i \geq 1]$ is defined as follows (see Appendix A.2). The rules are the following.

$$\begin{array}{l}
\top\top \rightarrow \top\top \qquad \top x \rightarrow \top x \quad \forall x \in [-M, M] \\
1\top \rightarrow 1\top \qquad 1n \rightarrow (n+1)\top \quad \forall n \in [-M, 0] \\
\qquad \qquad \qquad 1p \rightarrow 1p \quad \forall p \in [1, M] \\
\\
\forall n \in [-M, 0], \forall p \in [2, M-1] \\
n\top \rightarrow n0 \qquad p\top \rightarrow p\top \\
nx \rightarrow nx \quad \forall x \in [-M, M], \quad pn \rightarrow (n+1)(p-1) \\
\qquad \qquad \qquad pp' \rightarrow pp' \quad \forall p' \in [1, M]
\end{array}$$

Case $k \geq 2$. Our protocol is deterministic and from Proposition 1 uniquely determined by the sets $Stable^I(q)$, $Stable^R(q)$, and by the values $max^I(q)$, $max^R(q)$ defined as follows.

$q \in Q$	$Stable^I(q)$	$max^I(q)$	$Stable^R(q)$	$max^R(q)$
\top	$\{\top\} \cup [-M, 0] \cup [k, M]$	-1	$\{\top\} \cup [-M, M]$	
$n \in [-M, -1]$	$[-M, M]$	0	$\{\top\} \cup [-M, 0]$	$(n+1)$
0	$[-M, M]$	0	$\{\top\} \cup [-M, k-1]$	1
1	$\{\top, 0, M\}$	\top	$[-M, 0]$	2
$p \in [2, k-1]$	$\{\top, 0, M\}$	$(p-1)$	$[-M, 0]$	$(p+1)$
$b \in [k, M-1]$	$\{\top\} \cup [k, M]$	$(b-1)$	$\{\top\} \cup [-M, 0] \cup [k, M]$	$(b+1)$
M	$\{\top\} \cup [k, M]$	$(M-1)$	$\{\top\} \cup [-M, M]$	

The transition rules we obtain from these sets and values are the following.

$$\begin{array}{l}
\top\top \rightarrow \top\top \qquad \top x \rightarrow \top x \quad \forall x \in [-M, 0] \cup [k, M] \\
\top p \rightarrow (p+1)(-1) \quad \forall p \in [1, k-1] \\
1\top \rightarrow 1\top \qquad 10 \rightarrow 10 \\
1x \rightarrow (x+1)\top \quad \forall x \notin \{\top, 0, M\} \quad 1M \rightarrow 1M \\
\\
\forall p \in [2, k-1] \\
p\top \rightarrow p\top \qquad px \rightarrow (x+1)(p-1) \quad \forall x \notin \{\top, 0, M\} \\
p0 \rightarrow p0 \qquad pM \rightarrow pM \\
\\
\forall n \in [-M, 0] \\
n\top \rightarrow n0 \qquad nx \rightarrow nx \quad \forall x \in [-M, M] \\
\\
\forall b \in [k, M] \\
b\top \rightarrow b\top \qquad bb' \rightarrow bb' \quad \forall b' \in [k, M] \\
bx \rightarrow (x+1)(b-1) \quad \forall x \in [-M, k-1]
\end{array}$$

We say that an agent in state $x \in [-M, M]$ has weight x and that an agent in state \top has weight 0. Note that in the initial configuration the sum of the weights of all agents is exactly $\sum a_i x_i$. Note that any of the rule of our protocol does not modify the total weight of the population, i.e., at any step of the execution, the sum of the weights of all agents is exactly $\sum a_i x_i$.

Note that the stable configurations, (i.e., the configurations where no rule can be applied to modify the state of any agent), are the following:

- every agent a is in some state $n(a) \in [-M, 0]$,
- a unique agent is in state $p \in [1, k - 1]$ and every other agent is in state 0.
- every agent a is either in some state $b(a) \in [k, M]$ or in state \top .

Note that no agent starts in state \top , and that no rule enables the two interacting agents to enter the state \top except for the rule $\top\top \rightarrow \top\top$. Thus, we know that it is impossible that all agents are in state \top . Consequently, in the last case described, we know that there is at least one agent in a state $b \in [k, M]$.

Note that in any stable configuration, all agents have the same output; if $\sum a_i x_i \geq k$ then all agents output 1, while in all the other cases, the agents output 0. Thus, if the population reaches a stable configuration, we know that the computed output is correct and that it will not be modified any more. Now, we should prove that the fairness condition ensures that we always reach a stable configuration. In fact, it is sufficient to prove that from any reachable configuration, there exists an execution that reaches a stable configuration.

Consider any configuration reached during the execution. As long as there is an agent in state $p \in [1, M]$ and an agent in state $n \in [-M, -1]$, we apply $pn \rightarrow (n+1)(p-1)$. Thus we can always reach a configuration where the states of all agents are in $[-M, 0] \cup \{\top\}$ if $\sum a_i x_i \leq 0$, or in $[0, M] \cup \{\top\}$ otherwise.

If $\sum a_i x_i \leq 0$, then there is at least one agent in state $n \in [-M, 0]$, since all agents cannot be in state \top . In this case, applying iteratively the rule $n\top \rightarrow n0$, we reach a stable configuration where all agents have a state in $[-M, 0]$.

Suppose now that $\sum a_i x_i \in [1, k - 1]$. Since $\sum a_i x_i \in [1, k - 1]$, each agent with a positive weight is in a state in $[1, k - 1]$. Applying iteratively the rule $pp' \rightarrow (p-1)(p'+1)$ where $p, p' \in [1, k - 1]$, we reach a configuration where there is exactly one agent in state $p \in [1, k - 1]$ while all the other agents are in state 0 or \top . Applying iteratively the rules $\top p \rightarrow (p+1)(-1)$ and $(p+1)(-1) \rightarrow 0p$, we reach a configuration where one agent is in state $p \in [1, k - 1]$ while all the other agents are in state 0.

Finally, assume that $\sum a_i x_i \geq k$. If there is an agent in state $p \in [1, k - 1]$, we know that there is at least another agent in state $q \in [1, M]$. If $p + q \leq M$, applying iteratively the rule $pq \rightarrow (p-1)(q+1)$ between these two agents, we reach a configuration where one of these two agents is in state 0 while the other is in state $p+q$. In this case, we have strictly reduced the number of agents in a state in $[1, k - 1]$. If $p+q > M \geq 2k$, then $q \in [k, M]$, and applying iteratively the rule $qp \rightarrow (q-1)(p+1)$, we reach a configuration where one agent is in state k while the other agent is in state $p+q-k \in [k, 2M]$. Here again, we have strictly reduced the number of agents in a state in $[1, k - 1]$. Applying these rules as long as there exists an agent in state $p \in [1, k - 1]$, we reach a configuration where all

agents are either in a state in $[k, M]$, or in state 0 or \top . Since $\sum a_i x_i \in [k, M]$, we know there exists an agent in state $b \in [k, M]$. Applying iteratively the rules $b0 \rightarrow 1(b-1)$ and $1(b-1) \rightarrow b\top$, we reach a stable configuration where all agents are either in state \top or in a state in $[k, M]$.

7 Modulo Counting

Proposition 4. *For any integers k, b , and any integers a_1, a_2, \dots, a_m there exists a Pavlovian population protocol that computes $[\sum_{i=1}^m a_i x_i \equiv b \pmod k]$.*

Due to lack of space, we only give the rules of the protocol for the case when $b \in [1, k-1]$ (see Appendix A.3 for the complete proof). In that case, our protocol is defined as follows: $\Sigma = \{\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_l\}$, $Q = \{\top\} \cup [0, k-1]$; for all i , let $\iota(\sigma_i) \equiv a_i \pmod k$; let $\omega(\top) = 1$ and for any $p \in [0, k-1]$, let $\omega(p) = 1$ if and only if $p = b$.

The rules are the following:

$$\begin{array}{l}
\begin{array}{l}
\top\top \rightarrow \top\top \quad \top 0 \rightarrow 00 \\
b\top \rightarrow b\top \quad 0b \rightarrow \top(k-1) \text{ if } b = k-1 \\
0\top \rightarrow 0\top \quad 0b \rightarrow (b+1)(k-1) \text{ if } b \neq k-1
\end{array} \\
\forall p \in [1, k-1] \\
\begin{array}{l}
\top p \rightarrow \top p \quad pp' \rightarrow pp' \quad \forall p' \in [0, p-1] \\
p(k-1) \rightarrow \top(p-1) \quad pp' \rightarrow (p'+1)(p-1) \quad \forall p' \in [p, k-2]
\end{array} \\
\forall p \in [0, k-1] \setminus \{b\} \\
\begin{array}{l}
0p \rightarrow 0p \quad p\top \rightarrow 1(p-1)
\end{array}
\end{array}$$

8 Conclusion

In this work, we present some (original and non-trivial) Pavlovian population protocols that compute the general threshold and modulo predicates. From this, we deduced that a predicate is computable in the Pavlovian population multi-protocol model if and only if it is semilinear.

In other words, we proved that restricting to rules that correspond to asymmetric games in pairwise interactions is not a restriction.

We however needed to consider multi-protocols, that is to say multi-games. We conjecture that the Pavlovian population protocols (i.e. non-multi-protocol) can not compute all semilinear predicates. A point is that in such protocols the set of rules are very limited (see Proposition 1). In particular, it seems rather impossible to perform an “or” operation between two modulo predicates in the general case.

Notice that the hypothesis of asymmetric games seems also necessary. We studied symmetric Pavlovian population protocols in [9] where we demonstrated that some non-trivial predicates can be computed. However, even very basic predicates, like the threshold predicate counting up to 5, seems problematic to be computed by symmetric games. With asymmetric games, general threshold and modulo predicates can be computed.

References

1. D. Angluin, J. Aspnes, D. Eisenstat, and E. Ruppert. The computational power of population protocols. *Distributed Computing*, 20(4):279–304, 2007.
2. D. Angluin, J. Aspnes, M. Chan, M. J. Fischer, H. Jiang, and R. Peralta. Stably computable properties of network graphs. In *DCOSS, LNCS*, pages 63–74. Springer, 2005.
3. D. Angluin, J. Aspnes, Z. Diamadi, M. J. Fischer, and R. Peralta. Computation in networks of passively mobile finite-state sensors. In *PODC*, pages 290–299. ACM Press, 2004.
4. D. Angluin, J. Aspnes, and D. Eisenstat. Stably computable predicates are semi-linear. In *PODC '06*, pages 292–299, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM Press.
5. D. Angluin, J. Aspnes, M. J. Fischer, and H. Jiang. Self-stabilizing population protocols. In *OPODIS'2005*, LNCS, pages 79–90. Springer, 2005.
6. R. M. Axelrod. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. Basic Books, 1984.
7. J. Beauquier, J. Burman, J. Clément, and S. Kutten. On utilizing speed in networks of mobile agents. In *PODC*, pages 305–314, 2010.
8. K. Binmore. *Fun and Games*. D.C. Heath and Company, 1992.
9. O. Bournez, J. Chalopin, J. Cohen, and X. Koegler. Playing with population protocols. In *The Complexity of a Simple Program*, Cork, Irland, 2008.
10. C. Delporte-Gallet, H. Fauconnier, R. Guerraoui, and E. Ruppert. When birds die: Making population protocols fault-tolerant. In *DCOSS*, pages 51–66. 2006.
11. M. E. Dyer, L. Goldberg, C. S. Greenhill, G. Istrate, and M. Jerrum. Convergence of the iterated prisoner's dilemma game. *Combinatorics, Probability & Computing*, 11(2), 2002.
12. L. Fribourg, S. Messika, and C. Picaronny. Coupling and self-stabilization. *Distributed Computing*, 18(3):221–232, 2006.
13. D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine. *The Theory of Learning in Games*. Number 624. 1996. available at <http://ideas.repec.org/p/cla/levarc/624.html>.
14. J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund. Evolutionary game dynamics. *Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society*, 4:479–519, 2003.
15. G. Istrate, M. V. Marathe, and S. S. Ravi. Adversarial scheduling in evolutionary game dynamics. *CoRR*, abs/0812.1194, 2008. informal publication.
16. A. D. Jaggard, M. Schapira, and R. N. Wright. Distributed computing with adaptive heuristics. In *Proceedings of Innovations in Computer Science ICS*, 2011.
17. D. Kraines and V. Kraines. Pavlov and the prisoner's dilemma. *Theory and Decision*, 26:47–79, 1988.
18. Othon Michail, Ioannis Chatzigiannakis, and Paul G. Spirakis. *New Models for Population Protocols*. Morgan & Claypool Publishers, 2011.
19. M. Nowak and K. Sigmund. A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. *Nature*, 364(6432):56–58, 1993.
20. M. Presburger. Über die Vollständigkeit eines gewissen systems der Arithmetik ganzer Zahlen, in welchem die Addition als einzige Operation hervortritt. *Comptes-rendus du I Congrès des Mathematiciens des Pays Slaves*, pages 92–101, 1929.
21. Jörgen W. Weibull. *Evolutionary Game Theory*. The MIT Press, 1995.